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ABSTRACT
This article adopts a genealogical approach in examining Israeli immigration policy by focus-
ing on the situation confronting African asylum seekers who have been forced back into
Egypt, detained and deported but who have not had their asylum claims properly assessed.
Based on immigration policies formulated at the time of Israeli independence, whose principle
objective was to secure a Jewish majority state, we argue that Israel’s treatment of African
asylum seekers as ‘inﬁltrators’/economic migrants stems from an insistence on maintaining
immigration as a sovereign issue formally isolated from other policy domains. Such an
approach is not only in violation of Israel’s commitment to the Refugee Convention, it directly
contributes to policies which are ineffective and unduly harsh.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the development of immigration/asylum policy in Israel where the state uses
immigration policy intended to maintain “a secure, Jewish majority state” (Perry, 2010: 157) to
deter/punish African asylum seekers entering Israel via the Sinai. We ﬁnd a useful starting point in
the work of Sassen who argued that, in the light of economic globalization, it is no longer
sufﬁcient “simply to assert the sovereign role of the state in immigration policy design and imple-
mentation” (2000: 66). She argued that nation-states would face growing constraints and challenges
– domestically and internationally – if they continued to treat immigration as a sovereign, autono-
mous process and policy domain. The reason why immigration/asylum is handled as an autono-
mous policy domain in Israel stems from an uneasy juxtaposition and contradictory relationship
between Israeli policies aimed at establishing a Jewish majority state and Israel’s international legal
obligations as a signatory to The Refugee Convention.
Section 1 provides an overview of Israeli immigration policies which have been used to create
Israel as a Jewish-majority state and the contradictions and problems which arise from this
approach. In Section 2 we outline the development of Israel’s refugee sector which has increasingly
challenged ofﬁcial decisions, through lobbying and litigation, to counter dominant social and politi-
cal views about the rights of African asylum seekers. Section 3 examines the problematic role
played by the Israeli Refugee Status Determination (RSD) system and Israeli asylum policies and
procedures. The procedure used to assess cases of disputed nationality, discussed in Section 4,
illustrates the extent to which Israel violates its international legal obligations and how unworkable
* Academic College of Tel Aviv Yaffo, Israel.
** School of Oriental & African Studies, London.
doi: 10.1111/imig.12070
© 2013 The Authors
International Migration © 2013 IOM
International Migration 2013
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISSN 0020-7985
this policy is. We conclude by reﬂecting that in a globalizing world nation-states must adopt
policies that conform to international legal norms and must pursue policies through regional/multi-
lateral initiatives if they wish them to be effective.
THE ROLE OF ISRAELI IMMIGRATION POLICY
From its creation in 1948, Israel has articulated a moral obligation to provide a place of refuge for
survivors of the Jewish Holocaust (and for contemporary Jews). It is in this light that the “basic
laws” which constitute the core of Israeli immigration policy need to be understood.
Israel’s “Law of Return” (1950)1 states that every Jew in the world has the right to come to
Israel to settle and acquire citizenship so long as at least one grandparent is Jewish. The law was
intended to provide protection and shelter to Jewish people on the basis of a shared national and
religious identity; there are no procedures for bestowing citizenship on non-Jews.
The “Law of Entry” (1952)2 regulates the right of non-nationals who are not “oleh” to enter and
reside in Israel. It deﬁnes procedures for acquiring an entry visa and sets out the basis on which
non-nationals may be deported. Any Jew who comes to Israel has the right to apply for an “oleh”
certiﬁcate and, under “The Nationality Law” (1952),3 may become an Israeli citizen. This law
allows returning Jews to acquire nationality by return, residence, birth and naturalization. The third
section of this law exempts Palestinians from acquiring nationality.
In 1954 Israel adopted the “Prevention of Inﬁltration Law”, the rationale for which was set out
by Moshe Dayan, who argued that
No state is as vulnerable as Israel in the conﬁguration of its frontiers; none has such memories of
recent aggression; none is beset by the nerve-racking experience of hearing the renewal of aggres-
sion repeatedly threatened; none is assailed even now by every form of hostility short of regular
warfare… (Moshe Dayan, 1955: 256–257)
Based on this frontier mentality, “The Prevention of Inﬁltration Law”4 deﬁned an “inﬁltrator”
(mistanen, Hebrew) as someone who “entered Israel knowingly and unlawfully” and who was “a
national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, or the Yemen” or
who was a resident, visitor or citizen of Palestine who was armed and who sought “to cause death
or serious injury to a person”. “Inﬁltrators” were nationals of an enemy country who were subject
to criminal law, were tried by a military tribunal and could be imprisoned for ﬁve years.
At the same time that Israel created the “basic laws” she also acceded to The Geneva Convention (in
1951), The Refugee Convention (in 1954) and the 1967 Protocol to The Refugee Convention.5 Israel
made limited “reservations” to those Conventions which means that she remains bound by international
law with regard to the establishment of RSD processes and the treatment of “refugees” (for clarity we
indicate in the text when domestic policy conﬂicts with international law). It is notable that Israel has
not incorporated The Refugee Convention into domestic law, and it has not translated the Convention
into Hebrew which means that ofﬁcials remain ignorant of Israel’s international obligations.
The “basic laws” constitute the core of Israeli immigration law and have been used to establish
Israel as a Jewish majority state. They provided the legal framework for the incorporation of 900,000
Jewish immigrants (Raijman, 2010) which inadvertently included a large number of non-Jewish Rus-
sian immigrants who were granted citizenship (Lustic, 1999). Furthermore the “basic laws” and the
gradual move to adopt a formal Constitution were used to justify the suspension of the rights of non-
Jews, e.g. Palestinians/Arabs and Africans. As Gross has remarked of this process:
… in current Israeli discourse, the deﬁnition of the state as Jewish (and not just democratic) may
serve to justify the full denial of civic equality to all non-Jews, particularly the denial of their
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collective rights as a national minority within Israel. It may also provide a rationale for the curtail-
ment of democracy, especially concerning equality for Israel’s Palestinian citizens’ (Gross, 2004:
10).
Israeli law justiﬁed the alienation of Arab lands (Richmond, 1993–1994) and has contributed
directly to a shortage of Palestinian labour which led business leaders to lobby government to allow
employers to recruit labour from overseas. The government subsequently allowed several hundred
thousand unskilled migrants from Romania, Thailand and The Philippines in to replace Palestinian
workers (Bartram, 1998, Raijman, 2010).
During the 1990s the principal “immigration” issues were: (a) the arrival of 14,000 to 20,000
West Africans who overstayed their tourist/pilgrim visas (Sabar, 2010: 49); (b) the presence of
100,000 foreign workers recruited to replace Palestinian labour, most of whom entered without a
visa and/or overstayed their visa; and (c) an estimated 50,000 tourists who over stayed their visas
(Bartram, 1998: 315–316). Because the Government failed to monitor and manage the entry of for-
eigners, a decision was taken in 2001 to embark on a massive operation to deport over stayers; by
the end of 2005 and at a cost of US$100 million, Israel ‘distanced’ approximately 140,000 persons
(Korczyn, 2011).
Rather than set out a clear policy, the Israeli government took a series of ad hoc decisions on
immigration issues: (a) to accept a small number of Vietnamese refugees in 1977 and 1979 (Phil-
lips, 2011: 10); (b) to accept one hundred Bosnian refugees in 1992 (Ben-Dor, 2008); (c) to rescue
‘Ethiopian Jews’ in the 1980s and 1990s (this continues under the rubric of ‘family reuniﬁcation’;
Offer 2004); (d) to accept a group of Kosovar Albanians in 1999; and (e) to accept South Lebanese
soldiers who collaborated with the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) (Herzog, 2009). To date, Israeli
decisions regarding asylum – a policy arena which remains undifferentiated from immigration –
have sought to prevent the entry of individuals who threaten Jewish identity and the Jewish charac-
ter of the state.6 Indeed Paz notes that asylum issues have been closely linked with Israeli security
concerns because of the fear that the recognition of African refugees “will open up the Pandora’s
Box of Palestinian refugees’ claims for territory, compensation and the right of return” (2011: 9).
From the early 1950s until 2001 UNHCR undertook responsibility to register and assess all asy-
lum applications made in Israel; its recommendations were sent to Israeli ofﬁcials for a ﬁnal deci-
sion. The process granted refugee status to a small number of applicants all of whom were required
to resettle in a third country (Table 1).7
In 2002, and in response to a hunger strike by refugees who had petitioned the Supreme Court,
Israel issued an asylum policy requiring UNHCR to register and process asylum applications;
UNHCR’s recommendations were sent to an Israeli inter-ministerial committee known as the
National Status Granting Body (NSGB) for a decision (Ben Dor and Edut, 2003). Applicants were
issued a UNHCR protection letter and, in most cases, a work permit (a B-1visa). Individuals whose
applications were approved by the NSGB were entitled to receive a temporary residence identity
card; they were not granted permanent status of any kind. Individuals categorized as citizens of
‘enemy states’ – which was extended to include The Sudan – were excluded from the asylum pro-
cess altogether. Between 2002 and 2005 Israel had only granted refugee status to 170 individuals.8
TABLE 1
APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM BY DECADE/YEAR
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
95 236 755 6,148 456 355 n/a 922 939
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ISRAEL’S REFUGEE SECTOR AND ITS ENGAGEMENT WITH THE STATE
The key values underpinning associational life among Jews was Zionism and a belief in the strug-
gle to create the state of Israel, which partly explains why human rights organizations like The
Association for Civil Rights in Israel9 (established in 1972) came into being so late.
In the 1980s there was a massive growth in the number of non-governmental organizations (Gi-
dron et al., 1998; Ben-Eliezer, 1999; Yishai, 2003). However they were relatively weak and were
closely aligned with the government (Yishai, 2008; Gidron et al., 2003). To the extent that
migrants who arrived in the 1990s were organized, it was into separate churches (Kemp, 2000; Sa-
bar and Shragai, 2008) or along religious/ethnic lines. Migrant community organizations provided
limited assistance to members and were not assisted by civil society organizations.
The situation began to change in early 2006 when, following a crackdown on thousands of Suda-
nese protesting outside the UNHCR ofﬁce in Cairo, Africans began to enter Israel via the Sinai. In
the face of growing numbers of Africans it soon became clear that the ofﬁcial Israeli response –
namely an attempt by the IDF to police the border – was ineffective.
We note two related developments which were set in motion in 2006: a ‘refugee sector’ came into
being alongside the development of African community-based organizations. The development of
these organizations reﬂected the failure of the government to establish clear, consistent and publicly
accountable asylum policies and clear, inclusive policies facilitating the integration of refugees.
The complete absence of basic services for asylum seekers/refugees led to the development of
NGOs who sought to provide practical support and services. These NGOs provide varying levels of
support – e.g. in terms of social services, legal advice, medical assistance, shelter, access to food and
child care – and possess varying organizational capabilities. Their emergence10 has been constrained
by the absence of funding, inexperience and the xenophobic attitude of Israelis who see Africans as a
threat to the nation and/or as “labour inﬁltrators” (Paz, 2011: 10–12; Yishay, 2008).11 It is against this
background that NGO efforts to assist asylum seekers and migrants must be assessed.
Several organizations have played a major role in challenging asylum policy via their engage-
ment in strategic litigation against the state. Between 1999 and 2000 “Hotline for Migrant Work-
ers” (Hamoked, Hebrew, 1998), which promotes the rights of undocumented migrant workers and
refugees, has provided para-legal support to 8,000 migrants, 800 trafﬁcked persons and large num-
bers of refugees held in detention (Hotline, 2009).12 Hotline has initiated hundreds of judicial
reviews and legal petitions seeking the release of detained migrants and African asylum seekers –
and it advocates policy change.
Tel Aviv University law clinic (established in 2002) also provides legal assistance to refugees
and asylum-seekers and promotes research to advance the reform of Israeli law and policy. There
are only a handful of lawyers engaged in asylum/immigration litigation, most of whom are rela-
tively inexperienced in immigration-related litigation, which partly explains why litigation seeking
to prevent deportation of Africans seeking asylum has been unsuccessful.
By expanding its litigation, the nascent refugee sector has successfully challenged decisions taken
by ofﬁcials on the cases of individual migrants/refugees. Their work, which is also taken up in high-
level discussions between the Ministry of Interior, UNHCR and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, is
aimed at getting Israel to adopt policies which comply with her international legal obligations.
Importantly, immigration ofﬁcials are increasingly subject to new forms of judicial accountability.
THE PROBLEMATIC ROLE OF ISRAEL’S RSD SYSTEM
From 2006 onwards the number of Africans seeking asylum in Israel has increased rapidly. A total
of 59,634 African “inﬁltrators” have arrived since January 2006 (Table 2).13 The ﬁrst to arrive
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were Sudanese Darfuri who had been pushed out of Egypt in 2006. On crossing into Israel they
were not treated as individuals in need of protection but as “inﬁltrators”, dangerous citizens of an
“enemy state” who should be arrested, detained and deported14 under the 1954 “Prevention of Inﬁl-
tration Law” (which contravenes Article 44 of the Geneva Convention; see Korczyn, 2011). Fol-
lowing legal interventions by human rights activists and UNHCR, the government released early
arrivals into the custody of various Kibbutz; for those arriving later the period of detention was
shortened and most were released without special reporting restrictions.15
The story of “Omar’ illustrates the contradictions at the heart of the authorities’ efforts to
deter/control African asylum-seekers. Omar left his village in 2003 following an attack by Suda-
nese soldiers in which family members died. He ﬂed to Khartoum, where he was detained, and
after his release he escaped to Egypt. He attended the demonstration at Mustafa Mahmud Square
and was detained by the Egyptian authorities. On release he crossed into Israel in October 2007
after paying Bedouin smugglers. On arrival in Israel he was arbitrarily chosen as one of ﬁve hun-
dred Darfuri’s to be given a temporary residence permit. His own asylum claim was not exam-
ined and although he is a citizen of an “enemy state” (The Sudan) he was recognized on the
same terms as other refugees. In 2009 he was arrested on a criminal charge and brieﬂy detained.
At the time of his arrest his identity document was conﬁscated. When he was ﬁnally allowed to
retrieve his ID, the Ministry of Interior refused to extend its validity. Omar has sought to renew
his ID but each time the authorities require him to produce additional documentation. In 2011
the Ministry informed him that he is required to undergo an identity interview and a full asylum
interview.
Initially, and exceptionally, Omar was granted status in 2007 as a member of a designated group
of Darfuri refugees following intervention by the Prime Minister who responded to growing public
support for Darfuri “survivors of genocide”. The grant of temporary residence to a group of Darfuri
asylum seekers, based solely on the date of their entry into the country, contravenes Israel’s obliga-
tions to put into place procedures to assess individual applications (UNHCR, 1992: Pt. II) and is
deeply problematic. For instance Darfuris who entered Israel after 2007 have not been offered tem-
porary protection. Furthermore those who “beneﬁted” from temporary protection have had their
asylum claims taken out of the RSD system, i.e. the authorities have consistently refused to assess
their claims (Hotline, nd: 8-f; Kritzman-Amir, 2009). Omar’s story demonstrates the capricious nat-
ure of ofﬁcial decisions which identify a “group” for special consideration while simultaneously
treating individual members of that group in a harsh and unpredictable manner.
The second, and largest, group of Africans to arrive were Eritreans (Table 3). In 2007 the author-
ities made an ad hoc decision to grant temporary work permits (B1 visas) to an arbitrarily deﬁned
group of 2000 Eritreans, based solely upon the date they entered Israel,16 a decision that violates
TABLE 2
THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN “INFILTRATORS” BY YEAR
Year Number entering
2006 2,789
2007 5,434
2008 9.253
2009 5,318
2010 14,744
2011 16,816
2012
(January-March)
5,250
Total 59,634
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Israel’s obligations under The Refugee Convention. As with Darfuri asylum applicants, the authori-
ties have refused to assess their claims (Hotline, nd: 8-f).
While the authorities were clearly unprepared for the arrival of asylum seekers in 2006, they
have continued to respond by adopting ad hoc, punitive measures including the deployment of the
IDF to prevent individuals from entering Israel and detaining “inﬁltrators” in the country.17
From 2006 onwards UNHCR has only been allowed to issue a “protection letter” which states
that asylum applicants have ofﬁcially registered, i.e. UNHCR cannot issue work permits. The
absence of a work permit makes it difﬁcult for individuals to survive. Indeed, in violation of Arti-
cle 17 of The Refugee Convention, Africans are vulnerable to arrest and deportation for working
illegally even though their asylum application has not been examined. In 2008 the government
established a new asylum registration unit and transformed Ktziot prison into a detention centre for
“inﬁltrators” (individuals are sent there to be “identiﬁed” and medically examined). In 2008 a new
“Anti-Inﬁltration Bill” was tabled in the Knesset (Parliament) and was passed into law in early
2012; this bill replaces the 1954 “Prevention of Inﬁltration Law” and, in violation of Article 16 of
the Refugee Convention, introduces much harsher penalties, including detention without trial for
three years.18 In 2009 the authorities ramped up efforts to arrest and deport foreigners including
individuals with UNHCR protection letters (in violation of UNHCR policy; 1992: Pt. II, sec. vii).
The Egyptian military has periodically shot, arrested and detained individuals attempting to cross
(but has refused to police) the border, while local Bedouin kidnap, torture and ransom Africans
crossing into Israel. At the same time, and under the rubric of “hot returns”, the IDF attempt to pre-
vent illegal entry by forcing individuals back across the border (without assessing their asylum
claim and without assurances from the Egyptian authorities about their treatment).19 The practice of
“hot returns” – which violates Article 33 of the Refugee Convention against refoulement – was
challenged in the courts by Tel Aviv University Law Clinic and Hotline for Migrant Workers.20 In
July 2011 their petition was denied because the state attorney said that “hot returns” no longer
occurred even though there is clear evidence to the contrary.21
Inﬁltrators detained at Ktziot Prison, which houses thousands of individuals,22 are held indeﬁ-
nitely only to be arbitrarily released without having their asylum claim taken or assessed. Individu-
als are given a bus ticket to Tel Aviv where they sleep rough and attempt to ﬁnd work. Although
the government does not publish ﬁgures on the detention of inﬁltrators23its intentions are clear: in
2010 Israel began construction of a new fence on the Egyptian border, created electronic border
surveillance and built a large purpose-built facility to detain up to 30,000 African “inﬁltrators”.24
The Prime Minister’s rational for these measures reﬂect his desire “to secure Israel’s Jewish and
democratic character”.25
The state has also attempted to restrict the right of movement of asylum seekers to speciﬁed
areas (the so called “north to Hadera, south to Gedera” policy) in an effort to make Tel Aviv a “no
go area” for cheap “inﬁltrator labour” (Paz, 2011: 6–7). This decision – which violates Art. 26 of
the Refugee Convention – prevented asylum seekers from accessing legal advice and assistance
from NGOs. Inﬁltrators caught in Tel Aviv were detained. In response to a court case26 in mid-
2009 the Ministry withdrew this policy.
TABLE 3
AFRICAN “INFILTRATORS” BY NATIONALITY (DECEMBER 2010)
Sudan Eritrea Other Countries Total
Number 8,256 19,442 5,575 33,273
Per cent 24.8% 58.4% 16.8% 100%
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In contrast to UNHCR protection letters, “conditional release” visas valid for three months were
issued by the authorities in 2007 to Eritreans and Sudanese and appear to have provided some
protection against arrest and deportation. These visas were issued by the Ministry of Interior in
accord with Israel’s “Law of Entry”. After Israel assumed ownership of the RSD system, asylum
applicants were issued with “conditional release” visas while they waited for their claim to be
assessed. From 2010 onwards the visa bears a stamp which says: “This visa is not a working per-
mit”. The language on the permit sends a clear message to prospective employers that hiring visa
holders is not “legal”. Following successful litigation which led the Israeli Supreme Court to ﬁnd
that Israeli’s who employ visa-holders would not be ﬁned, the Prime Minister announced “a
crackdown” on inﬁltrators (whom he termed “migrant workers”) and stated that “Employers who
hire illegal immigrants can expect to start paying signiﬁcantly higher ﬁnes as part of a govern-
ment campaign against illegal immigration”.27 In fact individuals holding this visa are discrimi-
nated against and struggle to ﬁnd work; their ambiguous legal status means that they are unable
to establish themselves and their families. Asylum applicants live in a state of constant insecurity
in crowded conditions; they rely on irregular and low paid work and the support of friends, rela-
tives and NGOs.
The authorities have sought to establish “return” agreements allowing Israel to deport individuals
to their country of origin without assessing their asylum application (which violates Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention). For example, Ministry of Interior ofﬁcials recently met with representa-
tives of the Eritrean government who rejected an agreement28to return their nationals. Indeed,
despite clear evidence to the contrary, the Eritrean ambassador stated that its nationals in Israel
“are not refugees, but work migrants” whose forcible return will “undermine national morale and
[they will] bring back with them frustration and bitterness”.29
The Ministry has established an unpublished agreement with Ethiopia which allows ofﬁcials to
document individuals held in immigration detention and deport them without assessing their asylum
claim. Various sources including UNHCR have conﬁrmed to the authors that among those deported
were: (a) “Ethiopians of Eritrean Decent” (i.e. “mixed nationals” who are stateless and at risk of
possible persecution in Ethiopia, see Campbell, 2011), (b) nationals of Eritrea, and (c) individuals
from other African countries. Deportees are placed into refugee camps in Ethiopia; worryingly, nei-
ther the Israeli authorities nor UNHCR know what happens to them.30
Critically the vast majority of asylum claims are not assessed; this includes Darfuris and Eritreans
who were given temporary status as members of a speciﬁc “group” (Hotline, nd: 8-f). Legal peti-
tions have forced the Ministry of Interior to reveal that in 2008–2009 only three individuals out of
the 3000 cases it reviewed were granted asylum and that during 2010–2011 the government
approved one claim while rejecting 3,692 other claims31 In cases where UNHCR made a positive
recommendation, the NSGB set the recommendation aside without explanation.32 The Ministry
does not publish its decisions. Furthermore it refuses to provide reasons why individual asylum
claims are rejected and it refuses to reveal the criteria used to determine the identity of Africans
held at the registration unit. Crucially an appeal process independent of the Government has not
been established.33
Ofﬁcials believe that the creation of ‘group protection’ for Darfuri’s and Eritreans has contributed
to “nationality swapping” (when individuals falsely register as Darfuri or Eritrean) and have
responded by initiating new procedures to ‘identify’ individuals. In mid-2011 an increasing number
of Eritrean claims were rejected despite a 2011 statement from UNHCR that most Eritreans have a
valid claim for asylum.
Unsurprisingly the capricious nature of ofﬁcial decisions and constantly changing policies create
considerable anxiety and insecurity among asylum seekers, as the case of Hassan illustrates.
Hassan was among those Eritreans issued a B-1 visa. He has been a refugee from early child-
hood when his family ﬂed from Eritrea into Sudan in the 1980s. After Eritrean independence in
1993 his family returned to Eritrea but got caught up in the border conﬂict with Ethiopia in 1998.
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Hassan, then a child, was conscripted into the military but escaped to a refugee camp in Sudan. In
Sudan he was not granted status and, afraid of being arrested, he ﬂed to Egypt and then to Israel.
Since Hassan has lived most of his life outside Eritrea and his Eritrean documents were issued in
Sudan, the registration unit concluded that he was an Eritrean and conﬁscated his visa until, months
later, legal intervention forced the authorities to return it.
Others less fortunate than Hassan are detained and deported before they are able to appeal (Hot-
line, nd: sec. 4.1–4.2). His case underlines the insecurity which arises from the failure to assess indi-
vidual asylum claims and from constant policy changes. The government’s recent announcement
that it would build a new, purpose-built detention facility for “inﬁltrators” and that the visa issued to
some asylum applicants was “not a work permit” seem designed to make asylum seekers panic.
In 2010, UNHCR transferred responsibility for the entire RSD process to a newly created RSD
Unit in the Ministry of Interior34 and in January 2011 a new “Procedure for Handling Political
Asylum Seekers in Israel”35 was issued. The document states that “… persons staying illegally,
who have submitted an application for political asylum, will not be deported until a ﬁnal decision
is made regarding their application”.
The new procedure stipulates that: (a) applications are to be submitted to the Ministry which reg-
isters and “identiﬁes” applicants using a preliminary interview; (b) should any suspicions about a
claim arise, a “basic interview” should follow; (c) if the Ministry dismisses an application, the
applicant has a right to appeal; (d) applications deemed problematic may be subject to a further
comprehensive interview (a decision on which can be referred to an Advisory Committee); (f) the
Chair of the Advisory Committee can consider an application and dismiss the claim (a decision on
the case is referred to a “Plenum” who send their recommendation to the Interior Minister); (g)
The Minister considers the recommendation and may recognize the applicant as a refugee or deport
the person; (f) applicants are supposed to be notiﬁed of the decision in writing within 14 days; (g)
an individual can appeal against a Committee decision; (g) individuals who are “subjects of enemy
or hostile states” will not be granted permits to stay; (h) if recognized, a person will be issued a
temporary “licence” to remain for up to three years; and (i) the procedure through which a recog-
nized refugee can apply to bring their spouse and minor children to Israel is outlined.
While an applicant is allowed to bring a lawyer to the interview, in fact there are very few refu-
gee lawyers and asylum applicants cannot afford them. Furthermore while in theory it is possible
to appeal against a decision, it is not clear on what basis decisions are taken or on what grounds
an appeal might be made (Hotline, nd). The document is premised on the assumption that claims
will lack credibility or will otherwise fail to meet the criteria set out in the Refugee Convention
(which has not been incorporated into domestic law and is not enforceable in domestic courts).
Three additional points are worth noting. First, Darfuris and Eritreans who were given temporary
work permits in 2007 have had their asylum applications removed from the RSD process despite
the fact that the very rationale for granting them protected status strongly suggests that their claims
should succeed. Second, in violation of Article 24, Sec. C and Article 8 of the Refugee Convention
respectively, asylum applicants are not entitled to work, to social security/beneﬁts or to non-emer-
gency medical care. Finally, individuals found to have valid claims are only provided with tempo-
rary “licences” to stay in the country.
Recently the registration Unit, which uses the new procedure, has called asylum applicants for an
interview to renew their permit (which is required every three months). But when asylum applicants
attend for an interview they are arrested and detained without being given a right of appeal. In
response “Hotline” and The Association for Civil Rights ﬁled a petition in the administrative courts
arguing that the arrests undermined the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33 of The Conven-
tion.36
The RSD process, now entirely in the hands of ofﬁcials, is deeply ﬂawed and in many respects
contravenes international law; furthermore RSD does not provide a fair assessment of asylum
claims and Israel policies generally are ineffective in stemming the ﬂow of “inﬁltrators” into the
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country. Rather than carefully designing and implementing policies which conform with Israel’s
international legal obligations, the authorities rely on poorly thought out ad hoc decisions which,
when challenged in the courts, lead to equally unlawful and ineffective decisions.
PROCEDURES TO ASSESS THE DISPUTED NATIONALITY OF DETAINED
ASYLUM SEEKERS
A telling example illustrating the ﬂawed and unlawful nature of Israeli procedures arises from the
manner it assesses the nationality of the 250-plus individuals currently held in detention. About
150 are these individuals are thought to be “mixed Ethiopian-Eritrean nationals”37 or Ethiopians of
Eritrean Descent who, in all probability, are de jure stateless persons (Campbell, 2011). In response
to a ACRI legal petition the Ministry published the three-page procedure38 it uses to identify dis-
puted nationals. The procedure requires “aliens” to provide documents – i.e. passports, birth certiﬁ-
cates, ID etc issued by another country which would “prove” their nationality – and/or a signed
request from an embassy that the person is obtaining documents, a travel document etc. and/or that
it will provide data to conﬁrm the person’s identity. Detainees are also told to provide the names
and addresses of family who can conﬁrm their nationality.
When ofﬁcials receive the required information they are supposed to contact foreign consulates
“to check if the alien may be deported”. The Ministry must come to a decision within sixty days
after which a disputed national should be released from detention. If it proves impossible to deport
a person within one year of their incarceration, applicants can request a temporary visa (a “B/1
waiver”) for six months which may be renewed for a further six months. Their case is supposed to
be reviewed one year after their release. The problematic nature of this procedure becomes evident
when we look at individual cases.
Yohannes was born in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1987; his parents were both born in Eritrea but
had migrated to Ethiopia. After his father’s death his mother married an Ethiopian national who
“adopted” Yohannes and his elder brother. During the 1998–2000 border war with Eritrea, his
adoptive father intervened to prevent them from being deported as “alien” Eritreans even though
neither boy had ever been issued with Eritrean (or Ethiopian) identity papers. After his mother’s
death in 2003 their “father” forced both boys out of the house; during the 2005 Ethiopian election
his brother was killed and Yohannes was arrested and detained. On release he ﬂed the country,
travelling through East Africa for ﬁve years before entering Israel in 2010. In his interview at Lod
it was accepted that: he was born and raised in Ethiopia; he was an ethnic Eritrean; he spoke
Amharic and Tigrinya; and he had never been to Eritrea. He was asked what his nationality was, to
which he replied ‘Eritrean’. On the basis of this reply the Ministry decided that he was being unco-
operative and detained him indeﬁnitely. Ofﬁcials reasoned that “it is hard to believe how he and
his family managed to live, work, study and own property in Adis without papers from Ethiopia…
The subject failed to prove having any common knowledge about Eritrea, answered most questions
wrong … To sum up I identify the subject to be an Ethiopian citizen, and since he continues to
claim the contrary, his case is rejected”. He was released from detention in early 2011 only to be
detained again in July 2011 when he came to renew his visa.
The information Yohannes39 supplied to the authorities should have established him as a stateless
person who cannot be returned to Ethiopia or Eritrea and he should have been released and given
status. His re-arrest and detention in July 2011 when he went to renew his visa underlines the arbi-
trary and unlawful way which ofﬁcials use the procedure.
There are, however, other problems with the procedure. First immigration-detention ofﬁcials are
often “unaware” of the procedure and fail to inform detainees about it. Second, the requirement
that detainees provide documentation contravenes UNHCR guidance which states that “the mere
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possession of a valid national passport is no bar to refugee status” (1992: 48). Furthermore when
Eritreans ask family to send documents, the package cannot be opened by the detainee without
invalidating the documents. In some cases a photograph is sent of the entire family – holding key
documents which were mailed to the detainee – in front of a clearly identiﬁable location in Eritrea.
The authorities either reject this evidence or hold on to it without assessing the claim.40 Finally,
mixed Ethiopian-Eritrean nationals are understandably reluctant to approach the Ethiopian embassy
because Ethiopia denationalized its ethnic Eritrean nationals, and because Ethiopian and Eritrean
ofﬁcials refuse to recognize such persons as nationals (Campbell, 2011).
The procedure ensures that Ethiopians/”mixed nationals”, Eritreans, Ivorians, Sudanese and many
others who may well have a claim as a stateless person have no prospect of being “identiﬁed” and
released (instead they are “distanced” using the unpublished agreement with Ethiopia). Finally it
should be noted that individuals are detained even when the Ministry’s decision is overturned in court.
CONCLUSION
Immigration policies in Israel, as elsewhere in Europe and around the Mediterranean, have failed to
grasp the nature and impact of globalization reﬂected in the expansion in the number and movement of
migrants and refugees transiting the world (a process linked directly to neo-liberal economic policies).
In an attempt to circumvent growing immigration and border controls, migrants and individuals
ﬂeeing persecution are undertaking longer overland routes on which they spend longer periods of
time in transit and where they are increasingly subject to greater danger, as evidenced by their
treatment in Libya, Morocco (Hamood, 2006; Collyer, 2006) and Israel. Ofﬁcials fail to ask why
the creation of growing border/immigration controls are ineffective in stemming this movement?
The reason why such policies fail is that governments refuse to acknowledge a key factor driving
the process, namely the demand for cheap migrant labour (de Hass, 2008). Instead ofﬁcials adopt
an “apocalyptic” approach and blame refugees and migrants for recurring social and political prob-
lems which are used by right-wing politicians to create public discontent and fuel racism.
It is in this context that the presence of the migrant/refugee brings into sharp relief the limitations
and failures of unilateral approaches to immigration/asylum policy just as it underlines the need for
multilateral policy initiatives. Israel’s failure to incorporate the Refugee Convention into domestic
law appears to have arisen from an over-riding political concern to ensure that Israel remains a
Jewish state. That nationalist vision has become linked to a major policy failure, namely a refusal
to de-link immigration policies from ad hoc asylum policy decisions which violate the country’s
international legal commitments.
The arrival of 60,000 African asylum seekers has brought into sharp relief Israel’s refusal to
develop a coherent asylum policy and its failure to comply with international law, as evidenced by
ofﬁcial reliance on a series of ad hoc decisions – e.g. grants of protection for arbitrarily deﬁned
groups of asylum seekers, constant changes to ‘policy’ and procedures, reliance on deportation and
detention, problems arising from a failure to develop a fair and independent RDS system etc. – result
in decisions which are ineffective and are overturned in court. In this regard government statements
that Africans are “inﬁltrators”/economic migrants represents an attempt to deﬂect public attention
away from Israel’s international legal obligations and poorly designed policies. Government state-
ments and policies have directly contributed to growing public hostility towards black, non-Jewish
‘inﬁltrators’ and have led to anti-refugee/foreigner demonstrations, riots and assaults on Africans and
organizations which support African asylum-seekers.41
In the age of globalization effective approaches to immigration/asylum policy require domestic
policies which conform to international legal norms and which are pursued through regional and
multilateral approaches to shared concerns about security, trade, immigration etc. If Israel fails to
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adopt and pursue such policies it will ﬁnd that its efforts will be ineffective and it will face three
insoluble problems. First there will be high domestic political costs with a go-it alone approach
toward immigration/asylum as evidenced by growing anti-African demonstrations. Second Israel
will face growing international condemnation and political isolation regarding its treatment of refu-
gees, which will make it impossible to manage, much less stem, the ﬂow of refugees and migrants
into the country (unless ofﬁcials are prepared to direct further violence at asylum seekers). Finally,
Israelis will pay a high economic cost: the recent announcement of a two per cent “tax” on every
government department to fund the construction of the security fence on the border, a detention
centre etc is the ﬁrst step in this direction.42
NOTES
1. See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Immigration/Text_of_Law_of_Return.html (accessed 1
June 2012)
2. See: http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/entryintoisraellaw.htm. (accessed 1 June 2012)
3. “Oleh” means a Jew who returned to Israel. See: http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/
nationalitylaw.htm (accessed 1 June 2012)
4. See: http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/preventioninﬁltrationlaw.htm
5. See: http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state = 113. (accessed 1 June 2012)
6. A common theme of the Prime Minister, see for instance: “Netanyahu: migrants threaten our national iden-
tity” (The Times of Israel, 20 May 2012).
7. Source: UNHCR Statistical Year Books. There is no data for 2003.
8. The ﬁgure was provided by UNHCR in a meeting at the Knesset in November 21st 2005, see: www.knes-
set.gov.il/protocols/data/rtf/pnim/2005-11-21-02.rtf (accessed 1 June 2012)
9. See: http://www.acri.org.il/en/?page_id = 158 (accessed 1 June 2012)
10. For an overview of the refugee sector see: http://www.frlan.org/node/263. (accessed 1 June 2012)
11. See: http://www.migrant-rights.org/2010/11/14/racism-toward-african-asylum-seekers-on-the-rise-in-israel/
and ‘Tel Aviv demonstration against illegal immigration’ (Arutz Shiva News 22 November 2011).
12. See: http://www.hotline.org.il/english/index.htm.
13. Government statements in September 2012 regarding the effectiveness of the border fence in stopping
inﬁltration are premature because there are many factors outside Israel’s control which are more likely to
affect the movement of Africans.
14. See: “Israel-Africa: deportation of Africans sparks concern” IRIN, 22 August 2007, available at: http://
www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid = 73854. (accessed 1 June 2012)
15. Source: Ministry of Interior reports and various Israeli press reports, Also see: ‘PM: Security fence to be
built along Jordanian border’ (Jerusalem Post, 01/01/2012).
16. See: “The Ministry of Interior: 2000 Eritrean’s Can Work if They Leave the Center of the Country” (HaA-
retz 5 August 2008) at http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1340925
17. Source: various Ministry of Interior reports.
18. See: “Israel passes draconian law on illegal immigrants” (The Independent, 11 January 2012) at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-passes-draconian-law-on-illegal-immigrants-
6287795.html. (accessed 1 June 2012)
19. See: “Egypt: Stop Killing Migrants in Sinai”, Human Rights Watch September 10th 2009, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/10/egypt-stop-killing-migrants-sinai
20. Petition number 7302/07 served to the Supreme Court on 28 October 2007, Verdict given on 7 July 2011.
21. See: ‘IDF arresting illegal aliens in Sinai’ (Arutz Sheva, 10 August 2012).
22. See: ‘Haaretz special report: Israeli jail grappling with rising swell of illegal African immigrants’, Haa-
retz.com, 24 November 2011).
23. For information on the detention estate and estimates of the number of persons held in detention, see:
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/middle-east/israel/introduction.html.
24. See: “Israel’s cabinet proposes building new detention centre for African inﬁltrators” (Haaretz 26 Nov.
2010 at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-s-cabinet-approves-building-detention center-for-afri-
can-inﬁltrators-1.327362. See also: “Israel’s detention proﬁle” at: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/
countries/middle-east/israel/introduction.html (accessed 1 June 2012)
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25. See: “Israel to build surveillance fence along Egyptian border”, The Guardian (1 November 2010).
26. Administrative petition 1694/08 served 16 April 2008.
27. Supreme Court petition no. 6312/10; the decision was announced on 16 January 2011; see: “Netanyahu
announces crackdown on illegal migrant workers” (Haaretz.com, 6 December 2011).
28. Source: ofﬁcial from the Ministry of Interior, 14 July 2011.
29. See: “Eritrean ambassador: We won’t take back inﬁltrators”, 1 December 2011 at: http://www.ynetnews.
com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrint. Stories abound about corrupt embassy ofﬁcials who compel
individuals to sign a “confession” and pay in US currency for a passport or travel document which the
Israeli authorities do not recognize.
30. See: “Israel using technicality to deport Eritrean asylum seekers to Ethiopia”, Haaretz.com 24 October
2011); “Israel Deports Asylum Seekers to Ethiopia in Spite of Possible Danger to their Fate”, Haaretz (24
October 2011).
31. Letter from Mali Davidyan to Yuval Livnat dated 12 April 2010; see also US (2011, sec. d).
32. Letter from Elinor Gezer to Yuval Livnat dated 12 July 2011.
33. Letter from Dudu Weizman to the ARDC dated 20 October 2010. Individuals are given “rejection letters”
but these do not necessarily set out the basis on which a decision was made.
34. The case ﬁles handed over to the Ministry to assess contained thousands of applications including individ-
uals who had resided in Israel for 10 years.
35. See: http://www.srlan.org/beta/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 111%3Aisrael-pro-
bono&catid = 36&Itemid = 120 (accessed 1 June 2012)
36. Petition number 38049-05011.
37. See: “Israeli judge: The state is risking the lives of Eritrean refugees” (Haaretz.com, 21 Feb. 2012).
38. Cf. “Procedure for Handling an Alien who claims that there is no country to which he can be deported”
(No. 10.1.0015, dated 7 July 2004). Copy in author’s possession.
39. Source: interviews conducted by ARDC and the Ministry of Interior (copies in author’s possession).
40. Source: interview with UNHCR ofﬁcials on 13 July 2010 in Tel Aviv.
41. See: Y. Lappin “Tel Aviv anti-African rally ends in rioting, assaults”, The Jersusalem Post (27 May 2012).
42. The cost of fencing the Sinai border and detaining a further 5,000 “inﬁltrators” is to be met by cutting
two percent from the budget of every government ofﬁce; see: “Netanyahu set to present plan to tackle
illegal immigration from Africa” (7 December 2011, Haaretz.com).
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